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WHAT THE \EQUAL WEIGHT VIEW" IS
Abstract. We examine arguments by Dawid, DeGroot and Mortera, Nissan-
Rozen and Spectre and nally Fitelson and Jehle against linear opinion pooling
implementations of the \Equal Weight View" response to same-evidence cases
of peer disagreement. We then give arguments in favor of geometric opinion
pooling, touching on a neglected result of Abbas that equal weight geomet-
ric pooling minimizes the sum of the information distances (Kullbeck-Leibler
divergences) from the common posterior to the agents' respective priors.
1. A triviality result for split-the-difference
In the epistemology of disagreement literature1 one encounters an Equal Weight
View, according to which\When you count an advisor as an epistemic peer, you
should give her conclusions the same weight as your own" (Elga 2007). Many have
taken \splitting the dierence" (i.e., adoption of the arithmetic mean) between
competing peer credences to be constitutive of this view. Kelly (2010), e.g., writes:
...if the agnostic gives credence .5 to the proposition that God
exists while the atheist gives credence .1 to the same propo-
sition, the import of The Equal Weight View is clear: upon
learning of the other's opinion, each should give credence .3
to the proposition that God exists.
The popularity of Equal Weight dierence splitting persists, despite the fact that
it was shown, a quarter century ago in Dawid, DeGroot and Mortera (1995), to
entail probabilistic incoherence. Indeed, it has been disputed that this coher-
ence result applies at all to the situation that interests us, namely that of two
peers having identical evidence but dierent priors. Bradley (2018), for example,
rehearses a version of the result, but goes on to write:
1We advocate in these pages for a certain solution to the problem of peer disagreement.
(And critique a popular alternative.) There is a common sentiment that there can't be a unique
solution to this problem; that ideal amalgamation of quantied belief by peers is a scenario-
dependent \art". Scenario dependence implies that there could be two situations in which pairs
of agents have equivalent credence functions over equal-cardinality nite partitions, yet properly
choose to amalgamate their quantied beliefs dierently owing to dierences in their respective
beliefs not reected in their raw credences over this partition. Here we will assume that the
agents don't have any relevant evidence beyond their own credences and those of their peer,
and that, accordingly, the peer update problem well could have a unique solution.
1
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...this study leaves open the question of whether linear averag-
ing is the appropriate response to situations in which you nd
yourself in disagreement with peers who hold the same infor-
mation as you and are as good at judging its signicance. In
the philosophical literature, the view that one should respond
to such disagreements by taking an equal-weighted average of
your opinions has been hotly debated. But nothing presented
here militates either for or against this view.
In this section, we make the case that considerations very much along the lines
of Dawid et. al. (1995) do \militate" (decisively) against split-the-dierence in
cases where two peers2 have the same external evidence but do not have almost
surely identical prior credences. We begin by supposing that i and j are agents
and P is a proposition-valued random variable, so that i's initial credence x in P
and j's initial credence y in P are also random variables. We take P 's distribution
to be supported on propositions P0 for which i and j are peers.
Because P is a random variable, there is some ambiguity concerning \credence in
P" we need to address. Suppose that a card, c, is drawn from a standard deck
and P is either Card c is a face card or Card c is an Ace (with equal probabilities).
In this case, P is in fact Card c is an Ace, but i doesn't know this. In such a case
there are two readings of \i's credence in P". On the rst reading, it refers to
i's credence in Card c is an Ace, namely 1
13
. On the second reading it refers to
i's credence in the proposition either P is \Card c is a face card" and Card c is
a face card or P is \Card c is an Ace" and Card c is an Ace, namely 2
13
. We'll
write Cri(P ) when we intend the rst reading and Cri(T (P )) when we intend the
second. (It may help to think of T (P ) as \P is true", read de dicto.) Notice that
Cri(P ) = x regardless of whether i knows the value of P , whereas it will typically
be the case that Cri(T (P )) = x only after i learns P or at least Cri(P ).
When we say that i is \diachronically coherent almost surely" or \Reection3
obeying almost surely", we mean in particular that if i's credence in P0 is x0 then
E(u(x; y)jP = P0) = x0; (1)
2Splitting the dierence with a non-peer can, by contrast, be coherent; if my credence in P
is one-half and I believe that your credence in whichever of P , :P is true is 1 with probability
:75 and zero with probability .25 then I surely don't consider you a peer (it seems that I think
you are more sensitive to which of P , :P is true, yet wildly overcondent), but should intend
to split the dierence with you when you tell me your credence.
3\Reection" was coined by van Fraassen (1984). Roughly, an agent satises it when her
current credence in a proposition P is equal to the expectation of her credence in P at a future
time t, where t is typically an almost-surely future, possibly random time satisfying certain
technical criteria (a so-called \stopping time"{see Schervish et. al. 2004). In the current
application t is the time immediately after j's credence in P is revealed.
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where u(x; y) denotes the posterior credence in P adopted by i upon learning the
values of P , x and y. (Or in T (P ) upon learning just x and y.)4 In particular,
for almost every x0 in the essential range of x one has
E(u(x; y)jx = x0) = x0:
That is, if she were to learn her own initial credence x = x0 (without learning P )
then she would both come to have credence x0 in T (P ) and expected posterior
(posterior to learning y, that is) credence x0 in T (P ).
Here is a natural necessary condition on peerhood.
PN: If i is diachronically coherent almost surely and regards
j as a peer then for almost every y0 in the essential range of
y one has E(u(x; y)jy = y0) = y0.
PN is nothing more or less than a mathematical translation of the truism that if
i regards j as a peer then she has the same condence in j's initial credences as
she has in her own. (There is therefore no reasonable cause for objecting to the
principle, though we will entertain one such objection in the nal section anyway.)
As observed above, if i were to learn that, and only that, x = x0, then she would
come to have credence x0 in T (P ). So if she regards j as a peer and were to learn
that, and only that, y = y0, then she ought, similarly, to come to have credence
y0 in T (P ).
5 But if she learns the value of x, say x = x0, after learning that
y = y0, her posterior credence in T (P ) will be u(x0; y0). By Reection, then, her
current (i.e. after learning y = y0 but before learning x = x0) credence, namely
y0, should be the expectation of this posterior, that is Ex(u(x; y)jy = y0).
We can now establish incoherence (on pain of triviality) of linear opinion pools
(including \split-the-dierence") for Equal Weighters.
Theorem 1. If i is diachronically coherent almost surely, regards j as a peer and
updates by linear pooling (i.e. u(x; y) = wx + (1   w)y, where 0 < w < 1) then
Prob(x 6= y) = 0.
4If there are only countably many propositions in the algebra from which P then (1) requires
no elaboration, but this assumption is not necessary. In the continuous case, we can interpret
E(u(x; y)jx = x0) as, say, limnE(u(x; y)jx 2 in(x0)), where in(x0) denotes the unique interval
[ k
2n
; k+1
2n
) containing x0. (And similarly for other expressions; here k is an integer.) Then all
claims are to be interpreted as holding for almost every x in the essential range of x, etc. (Such
issues are familiar and not dicult to navigate, so we'll not dwell on them.)
5We see here one reason for bothering about T (P ). If in the rst instance we were to learn
the identity of the proposition P (rather than just our credence in P ), we would have to imagine
learning the identity of the proposition P (rather than just our peer's credence in P ) in the
second instance as well. But that would automatically inform us of our our own credence in P .
So in order for the cases to be analogous, we can't learn the identity of P in either scenario.
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Proof. Since j is diachronically coherent almost surely, for almost every x0 in the
essential range of x one has E((u(x; y)jx = x0) = E(wx+ (1 w)yjx = x0) = x0:
But obviously E(xjx = x0) = x0, so in fact
E(yjx = x0) = x0 (2)
a.e. Meanwhile since i regards j as a peer, for almost every y0 in the essential
range of y one has E((u(x; y)jy = y0) = E(wx+ (1  w)yjy = y0) = y0 (by PN).
But obviously E(yjy = y0) = y0, so in fact
E(xjy = y0) = y0 (3)
a.e. If we now multiply (2) by x0 and then integrate both sides with respect to
x0 we get E(xy) = E(x
2). Similarly, if we multiply (3) by y0 and integrate both
sides with respect to y0, we get E(xy) = E(y
2). Therefore
E((x  y)2) = E(x2)  2E(xy) + E(y2) = 0;
completing the proof. qed
These considerations look to kill the dierence splitting implementation of the
Equal Weight View. On the other hand, coherent peer update schemes may
approximate dierence splitting. There is, moreover, a simple way of constructing
such schemes. Namely, by considering the parallel case in which the agents had
the same original priors, but have since acquired dierent evidence. Though this
isn't the case we are interested in, the existence of these scenarios limits the
methods by which one can hope to argue. (In particular, if one hopes to argue
against dierence splitting in the same evidence case on coherence grounds, one
had better be certain that one's argument doesn't overgeneralize.)
We sketch such a scenario. Suppose a point x is chosen uniformly at random on
the unit interval. A standard Brownian motion Z is initiated at x and evolves
until it exits the interval. P is the event that it exits to the right, i.e. at 1. Neither
i nor j know the value x. Suppose next that two independent standard Brownian
motions, Zi and Zj, are initiated at x and stopped at time t = 10
 24. i is told the
value xi = Zi(t) and j is told the value xj = Zj(t). Since the standard deviation,
10 12, of xi is so small, and since the expectation of xi is x, the expectation x
0
i
of x conditional on xi (= i's probability for P conditional on xi) will, with high
probability, be extremely close to (distance much less than 10 12) xi. Similarly,
j's credence in P will be, with high probability, extremely close to xj.
On the other hand, the expected value x0 of x conditional on xi and xj will with
high probability be extremely close to (distance much less than jxi   xjj) the
midpoint of xi and xj; so when i and j share their credences, they will, with
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high probability, adopt posterior credence x0 = u(x0i; x
0
j) in P extremely close to
(relative to jx0i   x
0
jj) the midpoint of their shared credences x
0
i and x
0
j.
To reiterate, this is not a same evidence scenario. However, the update rule u(; )
that falls out of it will be coherent in any same-evidence scenario in which the
joint distribution of the peers agents' priors x0i and x
0
j is the same. So to argue
against peer update schemes that approximate dierence splitting, one would have
either to propose norms directly constraining such joint distributions, or propose
indirect constraints. We examine two approaches of the latter sort presently.
2. On a putative peerhood constraint of Nissan-Rozen and
Spectre
Ittay Nissan-Rozen and Levi Spectre (2017) present an original argument against
dierence splitting as an implementation of the Equal Weight View. It fails, as
we shall demonstrate. It begins with a novel proposed constraint on peerhood:
Our main contribution takes the form of a pragmatic con-
straint on the notion of peerhood: if an agent, j, is your peer,
then assuming that j is sympathetic{she wants you to gain
as much as possible{you should be willing{in exchange for a
certain payo{to let her decide for you whether to accept a
bet with positive expected utility. If you are not willing to ac-
cept this exchange even for a sure payo, you do not seriously
regard j as your peer.
Nissan-Rozen and Spectre go on to prove the following theorem, in which P is a
proposition for which i has an initial credence, and i is committed to updating
by linear pooling upon learning j's initial credence.
Theorem 2. (Nissan-Rozen and Spectre 2017) Let i be an agent for whom j is
a fully rational and sympathetic peer. For any credence function of i that assigns
a non-trivial probability value to the possibility that j's degree of belief in P is
dierent from i's degree of belief in P , and for any 0 < w < 1, there always exists
a bet with positive expected utility such that i (if she updates by linear pooling
with weights w, 1 w) will be willing to pay a positive amount of utility in order
to avoid passing the choice of whether to accept the bet (on i's behalf) to j.
The bet guaranteed by Theorem 2 violates Nissan-Rozen and Spectre's pragmatic
constraint. If the constraint is viable, then, dierence splitting Equal Weighters
do not regard their fellow agents as peers, which implies in particular that split-
the-dierence cannot be a workable implementation of the Equal Weight View.6
6Nissan-Rozen and Spectre also prove that there will be a bet with positive expected utility
such that a dierence splitting i will be inclined to pay a positive amount of utility in order
to pass the bet to j. This violates an apparently endorsed (if only implicitly) variant of their
constraint whereby you should be willing{in exchange for a certain payo{to decide for yourself
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Nissan-Rozen and Spectre claim that their constraint (in conjunction with Theo-
rem 2) \makes room for the development of a new Conciliatory view that calls for
varying weights" (Nissan-Rozen and Spectre 2017). We take a \variable weight"
rule to be one for which u(x; y) lies strictly between x and y, if x 6= y, and
u(x; x) = x.7 But on this understanding, Theorem 2 doesn't make room for such
views; if in fact the argument attaches a decient notion of peerhood to split-the-
dierence, variable weight Conciliatory views are collateral damage.
To see why, let u(y) be i's posterior credence under such a scheme when i learns
y = Crj(P ). Since we are assuming a \variable weight" rule the function u(y)
satises u(y) = x for x = y, with u(y) strictly between x and y otherwise. Since
i regards j as a peer, meanwhile, we can assume that u(y) is strictly increasing.
Finally, since i is coherent, she should obey Reection; in particular her initial
credence x = Cri(P ) is the expectation of her posterior, i.e. x = Ey(u(y)).
Under these assumptions, one can always nd a bet that i will pay a positive
amount to avoid passing to j whenever y isn't, by i's lights, equal to x almost
surely. For in such a case i must, by non-triviality and Reection, assign positive
probability to the event y < u(y) < x. Let y0 be the essential inmum of y.
8
Choose k with y0 < k < u(y0) < x. Bet 1 pays 1 if P is true and pays 0 if P
is false, if accepted; one receives a sure k if Bet 1 is rejected. Since i's posterior
(after learning y, that is) credence in P is almost surely greater than k, acceptance
of Bet 1 has positive expected utility for i. She will be willing, moreover, to pay
any amount less than (u(y0)  k)Prob(y < k) > 0 to avoid having this bet passed
to j, since j would reject it whenever y < k.
We think what Nissan-Rozen and Spectre had in mind was that one should deem
a peer as being no worse (in expectation) than oneself when it comes to accepting
or rejecting a bet of the form given (1 if the proposition is true and 0 if it is false,
whether to accept a bet with positive expected utility in a case where you are otherwise obliged
to pass it to j. The details aren't precisely the same, but this variant overgeneralizes as well,
and so cannot be used to resuscitate the Nissan-Rozen/Spectre argument. In any event we set
this aside, as they don't formally invoke (or even formulate) the variant in question.
7Some authors (e.g. Easwaran et. al. 2016) advocate for synergy, which implies that in case
y = x 6= 1
2
, i's posterior distribution should be more extreme than the common initial credence.
Synergy is appropriate to the more common case where disagreeing peers have dierent evidence
and the same priors. Suppose for example that i and j have common prior distribution that is
uniform on [0; 1] for the bias of a coin and are each allowed to toss the coin once, privately. If
they reconvene and simultaneously announce credence of 1
3
in the next toss of the coin landing
heads, they will update not to 1
3
but to 1
4
(Laplace rule of succession). That is because their
disclosures eectively allow for a pooling of evidence. Something like this is going on, for
example, when so-called meta-analyses obtain \statistically signicant" results (i.e. suciently
extreme p values) by pooling studies that individually were unable to derive such results. In
the same-evidence case we are interested in, however, the practice is plainly unjustied, indeed
a bit like concluding that, because a certain balloon looks orange to everyone in the room, it
must therefore be red.
8That is, Prob(y < y0) = 0, but Prob(y > y0 + ) > 0 for every  > 0.
WHAT THE \EQUAL WEIGHT VIEW" IS 7
if accepted; a certain amount c if rejected), prior to learning one's own initial
credence x in the proposition in question. Once one learns the value of x, that
might change. If x is very close to c, the agent will recognize that the expected
relative utility of her choice is small (non-existent, when x = c), and she may
want to pass the bet to j. In at least some other cases (cases in which x and c
are not close, typically), she will be inclined to want to eld the bet herself.
The proposed constraint is therefore implausible{it would, if valid, rule out too
much. That is to say, it can't be a requirement of peerhood that for every such
oer one should think that one's peer has expected return not less than one's
own. We conclude that Nissan-Rozen and Spectre's argument fails.
3. On a would-be desideratum of Fitelson and Jehle
Fitelson and Jehle (2009) attempt to discredit dierence splitting simpliciter (i.e.
their argument does not invoke peerhood) on the grounds that it fails to com-
mute with conditionalization. Such an argument, it's probably worth mentioning,
cannot counsel against dierence splitting for two cell partitions, for the simple
reason that if one conditionalizes on a non-trivial event from a two cell partition,
the resulting space is trivial and there is only one candidate credence function over
it. So Theorem 1 is more general, even if this alternative argument has merit.
The argument in its current form is seriously gapped, however, owing to the fact
that Fitelson and Jehle believed the matter to be much simpler than it is. Indeed,
they regarded it as transparent enough to relegate to a footnote:
Some Bayesian defenders of EWV require that (ideally) the
result of an EWV update should be equivalent to a (classi-
cal) conditionalization, which conditionalizes \on whatever y-
ou...have learned about the circumstances of the disagreemen-
t" (Elga 2007, 490). If that's right, then [commutativity] will
follow from the denition of (classical) Bayesian condition-
alization, since pairs of (classical) conditionalizations must
commute. (Fitelson and Jehle 2009, footnote 12.)
That isn't quite right. What's true is that if i conditions on A and then condi-
tions on B, she should arrive at the same posterior as if she were to have rst
conditioned on B and then on A. But that's not what's going on here.
Suppose for example that i's original prior on (A;B;C) is (1
2
; 1
4
; 1
4
) and j's is
(1
4
; 1
2
; 1
4
). It is certainly true that i should arrive at the same posterior if she rst
learned j's credence function then learned :C as she should if she rst learned
:C and then learned j's original prior. And these are just the propositions i will
learn in a case where the agents rst perform a peer update and then condition on
:C. It is not, however, what i will learn if the agents rst condition on :C and
then perform a peer update. In the latter case, i will learn only that j's original
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prior was of the form (x; 2x; 1   3x) for some 0 < x  1
3
. There is no (obvious)
reason to think, then, that her posterior here must be the same.
In fact, one can easily construct coherent peer update rules that fail to commute
with conditionalization: rules that approximate split-the-dierence, for example,
will violate this commutativity. The two-cell scheme presented at the end of
Section 1 can be adapted to three cells to this end, as we now show.
Consider an equilateral triangle and a point generated uniformly at random in its
interior, having barycentric coordinates (x; y; z) (x, y and z denote the distances
from the point to the sides of the triangle; we assume x + y + z = 1). A two
dimensional Brownian motion will be initiated at this point. When it hits a
side (i.e. when one of the coordinates becomes zero), the Brownian motion will
become 1-dimensional on that side until it terminates at a vertex. Let PX be the
event that the motion terminates at the vertex X having barycentric coordinates
(1; 0; 0); PY and PZ are similarly dened.
Neither i nor j knows the initial point (x; y; z). However, they each learn the
identity of a nearby point{points (xi; yi; zi) and (xj; yj; zj) respectively{chosen
from independent bivariate normal distributions having mean at the point with
barycentric coordinates (x; y; z) and common, extremely small known variance.
Assuming the agents to be rational, their resulting credences in (PX ; PY ; PZ) will
be (x0i; y
0
i; z
0
i)  (xi; yi; zi) and (x
0
j; y
0
j; z
0
j)  (xj; yj; zj). Upon sharing these cre-
dences, they will each come to have posterior credence (x0; y0; z0)  1
2
((x0i; y
0
i; z
0
i)+
(x0j; y
0
j; z
0
j)) in (PX ; PY ; PZ). The error in these approximations will be small com-
pared to the distance between (x0i; y
0
i; z
0
i) and (x
0
j; y
0
j; z
0
j) with very high probability.
In particular, the error will always be small in those (extremely) rare cases where
the points (x0i; y
0
i; z
0
i) and (x
0
j; y
0
j; z
0
j) are far from each other (and not too close
to the edges). For example, when (x0i; y
0
i; z
0
i) = (:02; :2; :78) and (x
0
j; y
0
j; z
0
j) =
(:8; :08; :12), peer update will result in a credence  (:41; :14; :45). If one then
conditions on :PZ one will obtain posterior  (
41
55
; 14
55
; 0). On the other hand
if i and j rst condition on :PZ they will come to have credences (
1
11
; 10
11
; 0)
and (10
11
; 1
11
; 0), respectively. If now they perform a peer update, preservation of
zero considerations and symmetry imply a posterior of (1
2
; 1
2
; 0) 6 (41
55
; 14
55
; 0). So
commutativity of conditionalization and peer update simply doesn't follow from
naive Bayesian (i.e. coherence) considerations alone.
Fitelson and Jehle did go on to say (as a hedge, perhaps): \But even if we don't
think of EWV-rules as equivalent to some conditionalization, we think [commu-
tativity with conditionalization] should remain a desideratum for EWV-updates.
We don't have the space to defend this claim here." The claim requires some sort
of defense. If coherence isn't available to ground it, what is?
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One would have to begin, we believe, with an attempt to explain away examples
such as the foregoing one in which something near to dierence splitting is ra-
tionally mandated. Note that the example favors dierence splitting because the
Euclidean midpoint of the segment connecting the ordered pairs whose barycentric
coordinates correspond to the agents' priors minimizes the sum of the absolute
deviations of the approximating bivariate normals (and so is near to the expec-
tation of their mean). One would have to say, then, why the Euclidean metric is
the wrong one to be working with in the generic situation in which two agents
have identical evidence but dierent priors.
On the other hand, perhaps one would not have to say much here, for there is
absolutely no reason to think that the Euclidean metric would be an appropriate
metric in this context. When measuring the distance from a probability measure
x = (x1; : : : ; xn) to another probability measure y = (y1; : : : ; yn), the information
distance{so called Kullback-Leibler divergence KL(x; y) =
Pn
i=1 xi log
xi
yi
, is a far
more likely default candidate. And, as we shall see below, when i and j's common
posterior is chosen so as to minimize the sum of these distances to their respective
priors, the resulting update scheme does commute with conditionalization.
Alternatively, one can argue that commutativity is appropriate in cases where
one doesn't have any reason to suspect it would fail. First one would argue
that, in a case where i knows j's prior credence function and knows that :C
(say) is the case, knowledge of her own current credence function \screens o"
the signicance of her prior credence in C. The example involving barycentric
coordinates shows why one cannot make this assumption on the basis of coherence
considerations alone...the joint distribution of the two priors over the (ordered)
partition in question{(A;B;C), say{may be such that i's prior credence in C
yields information about the relative likelihoods of A and B beyond that provided
by j's prior credence function and her own current credence function alone. That
example relies heavily on the two agents' dierent evidence, however. One might
argue that the same-evidence situation is dierent.
As an example, consider again the scenario in which i's original prior on (A;B;C)
is (1
4
; 1
4
; 1
2
) and j's is (1
4
; 1
2
; 1
4
). Suppose that if the agents rst perform a peer
update, their common posterior will be (x; y; z). (In this case y = z follows from
some seemingly innocuous permutation considerations, but we don't require this
here.) If they next condition on :C, their common posterior will be ( x
x+y
; y
x+y
; 0).
We want to say that if the agents instead: (1) condition on :C; then (2) perform
a peer update, they will arrive at the same common posterior ( x
x+y
; y
x+y
; 0). It's
clear that their credences after (1) will be (1
2
; 1
2
; 0) and (1
3
; 2
3
; 0) respectively.
Consider an alternate scenario in which the agents instead; (0) share their prior
credences in C; then (1) condition on :C; and nally (2) perform a peer update.
Here the agents will denitely land at common posterior ( x
x+y
; y
x+y
; 0) after Step
(2), for in this case they would have acquired exactly the same information as
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in the original case where they rst performed a peer update, then conditioned
on :C. It is arguable, moreover, that j's evidence in Step (0), namely i's prior
credence in C, should in the absence of any reason for thinking the contrary be
treated as neutral with respect to the relative likelihoods of A and B. Indeed,
expert testimony as to probability of C (say) is considered a or the paradigm case
in which so-called Jerey conditionalization (adopt the expert's credence in C as
your own, preserve ratios of other partition cells; Jerey 1965) is appropriate.9
At the beginning of Step (0) in the alternate scenario, for i to learn j's credence
in C is as informative as for i to learn her own posterior in C at the conclusion
of Step (0) (as in Section 2, we take posterior credence to be a strictly increasing
function of j's prior when i's prior is xed), and so formally equivalent to taking
expert (that of i's future self) testimony as to the likelihood of C. If that's right,
however, then the agents' credences after performing Step (0) will have the form
(a; a; k) and (b; 2b; l) respectively, so that after Step (1) they will have credences
(1
2
; 1
2
; 0) and (1
3
; 2
3
; 0) respectively, exactly as in the actual scenario of the previous
paragraph. Since the nal posteriors in the alternate scenario are ( x
x+y
; y
x+y
; 0),
then, the nal posteriors in the scenario from the previous paragraph will be
( x
x+y
; y
x+y
; 0) as well. That is, peer update commutes with conditionalization.
These considerations are convincing to us. Accordingly, we accept Fitelson and
Jehle's desideratum; in the absence of known protocols to the contrary (as in some
not-same evidence cases), peer update should commute with conditionalization.
4. Peer update and relative entropy minimization
The update scheme we consider to be the clear frontrunner (and only serious
extant contender for \default" status) is a case of a rule known by various names,
including logarithmic opinion pool and geometric opinion pool. Although many of
its positive features are well known, we will argue its virtues in a couple of new
ways. We shall also discuss a virtue that, while not original, has been neglected
in the philosophical literature{namely that geometric pooling minimizes the sum
of the Kullback-Leibler divergences from the priors to the common posterior.
Note that Easwaran et. al. (2016, Section 10.6) discuss the family of geometric
opinion pools, but reject those we nd most apt. (In their notation, these are the
ones for which the exponents wi sum to unity. But they write \It is clear that an
agent should assign her own exponent to be w1 = 1.") This is in part because they
are concerned with the dierent (in fact independent) evidence situation. Indeed,
they motivate their approach via a scenario in which i's distribution for j's initial
credence in A, conditional on A, is given by the density function fA(q) = 2q,
9Though it's dicult to say non-circularly what makes Jerey conditionalization appropriate
in a given case, the idea is that it should be valid when the information one gets about which
cell of the background partition obtains isn't contaminated by further information about the
likelihoods of your target proposition conditional on the various cells. In the case of expert
testimony as to the probabilities of the cells, there seems to be minimal chance of contamination.
WHAT THE \EQUAL WEIGHT VIEW" IS 11
independently of i's initial credence p in A. That's coherent10 but it can't be
a same-evidence case, for in such a case ideal epistemic credence screens o j's
credences from the truth value of A. (Cf. Easwaran et. al. 2018 Section 10.9:
\the bias of the coin screens o Q's credences from the outcome of the toss".)
On the other hand in Section 10.2 of their paper they do entertain a same-evidence
scenario (as such), and still see things very dierently from us. In their example,
pqr
pqr + 16(1  p)(1  q)(1  r)
is selected as posterior credence in A when three peers have priors p, q and r,
respectively, assuming a \default" credence of .8. They observe that if all three
peers hold to the default value, there will be no synergy. But if p = q = r = :9,
the agents will update to (:9)
3
(:9)3+16(:1)3
 :9785. That's synergy, so we reject the
reasoning leading to this formula for the same-evidence case. (Cf. footnote 4.)
According to the version of geometric opinion pooling appropriate to the Equal
Weight View, if A and B are two cells of the partition under consideration and
ri =
Pi(A)
Pi(B)
, rj =
Pj(A)
Pj(B)
are the ratios assigned by i and j to these cells' respective
probabilities, the corresponding ratio arising from the common posterior ought to
be the geometric mean of r1 and r2. In the two-cell case (A;:A), therefore, one
updates to (u; 1  u) given priors (x; 1  x) and (y; 1  y), where
u
1  u
=
 x
(1  x)
y
(1  y)
 1
2
: (1)
More generally, suppose n peers have prior credences (ai1; ai2; : : : ; aik) over parti-
tion (A1; A2; : : : ; Ak), 1  i  n. Common posterior is (b1; b2; : : : ; bn), where
bj =
Qn
i=1 a
1=n
ijPk
t=1
Qn
i=1 a
1=n
it
Call this scheme EGOP (For Equal-weight Geometric Opinion Pooling.) We'll
give three informal arguments in its favor for the case where i's prior is (1
5
; 4
5
) and
j's is (1
2
; 1
2
). That is, we'll argue in three dierent ways for common posterior
(1
3
; 2
3
). In an appendix, we'll present more formal (and more general) versions.
The rst argument appears in Abbas (2009), and proceeds by relative entropy.
The Kullback-Leibler divergence from (u; 1   u) to (1
5
; 4
5
) is given by u log u
1=5
+
(1  u) log 1 u
4=5
; the Kullback-Leibler divergence from (u; 1  u) to (1
2
; 1
2
) is given
by u log u
1=2
+ (1  u) log 1 u
1=2
. The sum of these quantities is
10Imagine q; x; y and z are selected independently uniformly at random on the unit interval.
A is the event x < q. q is reported to j and becomes her initial credence in A. p = maxfy; zg if
A is true, otherwise p = minfy; zg. p is reported to i and becomes her initial credence in A{we
leave it to the reader to verify that the situation is now as described above.
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H(u) = 2u log u+ 2(1  u) log(1  u)  u log
1
5
  (1  u) log
4
5
  log
1
2
:
The minimum of H occurs where
H 0(u) = 2 log
u
1  u
+ log 4 = 0:
A quick calculation gives (u; 1  u) = (1
3
; 2
3
), in agreement with (1).
For the second argument, imagine that a fair coin will be tossed if and only if
:A obtains. If i and j expand the algebra to accomodate the toss then of course
their expanded priors will be (1
5
; 2
5
; 2
5
) and (1
2
; 1
4
; 1
4
). Suppose now they were to
condition on the disjunction of the rst two cells (the event A _ (:A ^ heads),
say) and then perform a peer update. Their credences after conditioning will
be (1
3
; 2
3
; 0) and (2
3
; 1
3
; 0). Symmetry and preservation of zero considerations now
indicate that their credences will be (1
2
; 1
2
; 0) after the peer update.11
When i and j rst condition on A _ (:A ^ heads) then perform a peer update
(as in the previous paragraph), they learn, in the second step, each others' priors
in :A ^ tails. (Since the coin is uncontroversially fair.) It follows that i and j
gain no more information if they rst perform a peer update and then condition;
hence they will arrive at posterior (1
2
; 1
2
; 0) by this path as well. After the initial
peer update, then, they must have credences of the form (x; x; y). On the other
hand, permutation considerations point to x = y. That implies that i's posterior
credence in A, when she considers the coin toss, is 1
3
. The nal step is then that
peer update should commute with marginalization onto the original sub-algebra.
Beware: i mustn't subscribe to the commutativity of peer update and marginal-
ization in general. What justies it in this case (the proponent will say) is that the
ratio of the sizes of the to-be-amalgamated subcells is uncontroversial. Indeed,
in the case where i and j rst marginalize, then update, i's credences rst evolve
from (1
5
; 2
5
; 2
5
) to (1
5
; 4
5
), whereupon she learns j's post-marginalization credence
function, namely (1
2
; 1
2
). Since the coin is uncontroversially fair, however, this
gives her knowledge of j's pre-marginalization credence function as well, namely
(1
2
; 1
4
; 1
4
). So she acquires the same information she would acquire if the agents
were to perform a peer update rst, then marginalize. Accordingly, the update
and the marginalization ought to commute, in this special case.12
11We consider resistance to this step in the argument below; the other steps look more secure.
12One may make a fruitful comparison to van Fraassen's (1981) \Infomin" solution (which,
tellingly, is also that given by Kullback-Leibler divergence minimization) to the Judy Benjamin
problem here. When Judy receives a message yielding information about the relative sizes she
ought to assign the Red regions, this may (says Infomin) inuence her credence in Blue{but
not in a case where the message fails to alter Judy's relative credences in the Red regions (a
fortiori, in a case where Judy knows this in advance).
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For the third argument, observe that when an update rule commutes with condi-
tionalization, the posterior ratio P (A) : P (B) is a function of the two prior ratios
Pi(A) : Pi(B) and Pj(B) : Pj(B). For example (the general case is not more
subtle), consider two scenarios in which these prior ratios are equal, say
Scenario 1: (Pi(A); Pi(B); Pi(C)) = (
1
10
; 3
10
; 6
10
), (Pj(A); Pj(B); Pj(C)) = (
2
7
; 1
7
; 4
7
);
Scenario 2: (Pi(A); Pi(B); Pi(C)) = (
1
6
; 3
6
; 2
6
), (Pj(A); Pj(B); Pj(C)) = (
2
5
; 1
5
; 2
5
).
Denote posterior credence upon peer update in Scenario k by (ak; bk; ck), k = 1; 2.
The claim is that the ratios a1 : a2 and a2 : b2 coincide. Note that if the agents
rst conditionalize on :C, they will arrive at
(Pi(A); Pi(B); Pi(C)) = (
1
4
;
3
4
; 0); (Pj(A); Pj(B); Pj(C)) = (
2
3
;
1
3
; 0)
in either scenario. So if they do this and go on to a peer update, they will
acquire the same posterior (a; b; 0) in either scenario. Assuming that peer update
commutes with conditionalization, it follows that if they rst perform a peer
update and then conditionalize on :C they will again acquire posterior (a; b; 0)
in either scenario. So the ratios ak : bk and a : b coincide, k = 1; 2.
For x; y  0, write g(x; y) = z if it is the case that whenever Pi(B) = xPi(A)
and Pj(B) = yPj(A), posterior credence upon performing a peer update has the
form (a; az; c). We assume an insensitivity to permutations of (A;B;C) whereby
also g(x; y) = z if it is the case that whenever, e.g., Pi(C) = xPi(B) and Pj(C) =
yPj(B), posterior credence upon performing a peer update has the form (a; b; bz).
We claim that g(tx; sy) = g(t; s)g(x; y). To see this, suppose that
Pi(C) = tPi(B) = txPi(A) and Pj(C) = sPj(B) = syPj(A):
Posterior credence will on the one hand have the form (a; ag(x; y); c), and on the
other hand it will have the form (a; b; bg(t; s)). Putting these together, posterior
credence will have the form (a; ag(x; y); ag(x; y)g(t; s)). Finally, since
Pi(C) = txPi(A) and Pj(C) = syPj(A);
posterior credence will have the form (a; b; ag(tx; sy)) (more permutation invari-
ance is assumed here), yielding g(tx; sy) = g(t; s)g(x; y).
This is enough, assuming continuity of g, to conclude that g(x; y) = xnym for
some real exponents n and m. Add now the premise that i and j should \hold
fast" when their priors agree (so that g(x; x) = x, in particular), one gets the
restriction n + m = 1. Finally, if one wants updating to conform to the Equal
Weight View, one should have n = m, i.e. n = 1
2
= m, resulting in EGOP.
(Easwaran et. al. 2016 advocate for n = m = 1, which produces synergy.)
Unlike split-the-dierence, EGOP can be coherently implemented with a peer.
For imagine a proposition-valued random variable P . Denote i's initial credence
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in P by x and j's initial credence in P by y. Suppose that i regards j as a peer
and updates by EGOP. Assume for simplicity that i's distribution for (x; y) is
distributed on eight pairs, with weights as indicated in Table 1.
It is now easy to see that i is Reection-obeying. For example, if P0 is such that
x = 1
5
then, upon learning that P = P0, i's posterior distribution for u will be
(2
5
; 3
5
) on (0; 1
3
). In particular, E(ujP = P0) =
2
5
 0 + 3
5
 1
3
= 1
5
. The remaining
cases are similar, so i's behavior under this model exhibits diachronic coherence.
Table 1
x y u Prob
0 1=5 0 1=10
1=5 0 0 1=10
1=5 1/2 1=3 3=20
1=2 1=5 1=3 3=20
1=2 4=5 2=3 3=20
4=5 1=2 2=3 3=20
4=5 1 1 1=10
1 4=5 1 1=10
Though simple, this model's features render it a plausible (toy) implementation
of the Equal Weight View: apart from employing the EWV-friendly (1), i's joint
distribution for (x; y) and update function u(x; y) are symmetric in the variables
x and y, implying that, from i's perspective, her own credences and those of j
are treated interchangeably. Since also x 6= y with positive probability, we may
conclude that Theorem 1 doesn't overgeneralize in the manner of Theorem 2.
5. Objections entertained
Having seen some of EGOP's virtues, it is natural to ask about its potential
shortcomings. The rst we shall consider is that the scheme does not preserve
(all) independences.13 For example, if (A;B;C;D;E) is a partition over which
agents i and j have credence functions i = (
1
4
; 1
4
; 1
4
; 0; 1
4
) and j = (
1
4
; 1
4
; 1
4
; 1
4
; 0)
respectively, it is easily checked that they will update to (1
3
; 1
3
; 1
3
; 0; 0) upon mutual
disclosure of their priors. What might seem odd about that is the fact that both i
and j initially considered the sets F = A[B and G = B[C to be probabilistically
independent, whereas they do not so judge after updating.
But since diachronic coherence and peerhood (as we have dened these) are non-
negotiable, one should almost surely not raise a given zero probability, and so too
should update a cell's probability to zero when one's peer has zero credence in
13It does preserve independence of joined partitions; cf. Easwaran et. al. (2016), Theorem
9.2 (proof of which easily generalizes to our situation).
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it. By symmetry, then, (1
3
; 1
3
; 1
3
; 0; 0) is the correct posterior, so the intuition to
preserve independences at this level of generality must simply be misguided.14
The second objection is related to the rst, and concerns the fact that EGOP
doesn't commute with marginalization. Consider two agents who have credence
functions (ai; bi; ci) and (aj; bj; cj) over a measurable partition (A;B;C). Suppose
they share only their credences in A, learning that ai = aj =
1
2
. How should they
update in response? A naive intuition is that they should hold fast.
However, suppose that the agents intend presently to share their full priors. By
Reection, their current credences in A should be the expectations of these cre-
dences after the ensuing peer update. But if the agents subscribe to EGOP then
their joint credence in A after updating will denitely not be less than 1
2
, and may
well be greater than 1
2
. Indeed, it will be greater than 1
2
precisely when bi 6= bj, so
unless the agents assign full credence to the event bi = bj, their current credences
in A ought now to be greater than 1
2
.
To bring the seeming oddness of this into relief, let us pretend that these agents
only had the partition (A;B;C) described to them after sharing their priors in
A. (Up that that time, if they had been contemplating any partition, it was
(A;:A).) Clearly they would retain their initial credences in A up to the time
that the events B and C were described to them. Are we to take it, then, that the
mere act of calling attention to a renement of the initial partition is what led to
their increased credences in A? If that's right then we could just as easily have
decreased their credences in A, by calling attention to a partition (D;E;:A).
Recall, though, that indierence principles typically are partition relative. If
your attention is called to a 2 cell partition (A;D) and you have no reason to
favor either cell of the partition, your credences ought surely to be (1
2
; 1
2
) over
the partition. But if next you are told that D is the disjoint union of events B
and C, what will be your new credence function? It seems uncontentious that
this should depend on which partition(s) you take the indierence principle to
apply to. Why should the current case be dierent? If application of EGOP is
appropriate over some three cell partition (A;B;C), then one ought not expect
it to be appropriate to apply the principle over (A;B [ C). (And vice versa.)
Note that partition relativity fails to undermine our second argument for EGOP.
Call a partition over which it is appropriate to apply EGOP admissible. In the
second argument, one starts with an admissible partition P1 = (A;:A) then
tosses a fair coin if and only if :A, thus rening the partition to P2 = (A; (:A)^
heads; (:A) ^ tails). One then conditions on the union of the rst two cells of
14A referee worried that \you and I might agree...that C does not cause E and then after
(updating) agree...that C does cause E." Things are perhaps clearer in the dierent evidence
case. Returning to the example in the text, if I've learned \not D" and you've learned \not E"
then after pooling our data it's not contentious that our priors are as described and that we
update to (1
3
; 1
3
; 1
3
; 0; 0). So that independences aren't preserved by peer update is a brute fact.
WHAT THE \EQUAL WEIGHT VIEW" IS 16
P2, obtaining the partition P3 = (A; (:A) ^ heads). It is implicitly assumed
that P3 is admissible. But why? Well, we have also been implicitly assuming
that any partition obtained from an admissible partition via conditionalization
is again admissible. (It would make little sense to speak of commutativity of
EGOP with conditionalization otherwise.) So if P2 is admissible then P3 is. The
question, however, is why P2 should be admissible. As it happens, there is a
completely satisfactory answer to this question. Namely, P2 is admissible because
P1 is and the coin is uncontroversially fair. More generally, if a nite partition P
is admissible and Q is a nite renement of P then Q will be admissible provided
that a certain \rigidity" condition holds over P . That is, provided that, for every
cell A of P and every cell B of Q, the probability of B conditional on A is public
knowledge. (One may check that when this condition is met, applying EGOP
over Q is consistent with applying EGOP over P .)
A third objection relates to the rejection of linear pooling, and was formulated
by a referee thus: \A more cautious conclusion would be that this update rule
comes with conditions of applicability, for instance that you do not also accept the
principle PN." The referee suggested that one adopting this line might think that
\epistemological problems cannot be settled by mathematical argument alone".
The latter point may be a misunderstanding: we do not even assume here that
we know the proposition P under debate. All we know is our credence in P , and
our peer's credence in P . We needn't even know who the peer is, and indeed we
needn't even be a party to the compromise{we could be arbitrating on behalf of
two unknown agents assumed to be peers. All we have to go on are the credences;
there isn't any data on which to base a \non-mathematical" analysis. As for
rejecting PN, it's dicult to see how one could justify having credence .4 in
T (P ) upon learning that \peer" credence in P is .3 (say). To see why, again step
outside and pretend you are an arbitrator. If you defer to the credences of one
of the agents, but correct the other's for ostensible systematic error, you cannot
reasonably be said to consider them peers.15
6. Appendix
The following occurs as Proposition 4 in Abbas (2009), but has been largely
ignored by philosophers. This may be in part because Abbas also proves that
if one substitutes \inverse relative entropy" for \relative entropy", the resulting
optimization problem is solved by linear pooling. That might suggest to some
readers that entropy methods can be used to motivate either approach. But the
inverse relative entropy result strikes us as philosophically insignicant: when
one measures the Kullback-Leibler divergence from P to Q, one is treating P as
actual. It's nonsense to treat even one prior as actual in the act of updating to a
15If you attribute greater random error to the rst agent you might view them as \equally
competent", but this violates our agreement that we know nothing beyond the credences.
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posterior considered as non-actual{the inverse relative entropy application in fact
treats disparate priors as actual at dierent locations within a single equation.16
Theorem 3. Let (A1; A2; : : : ; An) be an ordered measurable partition. Suppose
that i and j have priors
i = (a1; a2; : : : ; an) and j = (b1; b2; : : : ; bn)
over (A1; A2; : : : ; An). Let H() = KL(; i) + KL(; j) take on its mini-
mum value (as  ranges over probability measures on (A1; A2; : : : ; An)) at 0 =
(c1; c2; : : : ; cn). Then for any xed indices l;m, 1  l 6= m  n,
c2l ambm = c
2
malbl: (1)
In particular, if ambm 6= 0 then
cl
cm
is the geometric mean of al
am
and bl
bm
.
Proof. Permuting indices if necessary, we may assume that l = 1 and m = n.
Writing 0  log 0 = 0, H() is continuous on a compact domain and so attains
its minimum value at some 0 = (c1; c2; : : : ; cn). Plainly c1 = 0 if a1b1 = 0 and
cn = 0 if anbn = 0; in either case, (1) follows.
We may therefore assume that a1b1anbn > 0. Writing  = (x1; x2; : : : ; xn),
H() = H(x1; : : : ; xn 1) =
nX
t=1
(2xt log xt   xt log atbt):
Since xn = 1  x1   x2        xn 1, the rst partial derivative of H is
Hx1(x1; : : : ; xn 1) = 2 log
x1
xn
+ log
anbn
a1b1
:
16Abbas oers no discussion about the \aptness" of the inverse relative entropy method.
Douven and Romeijn (2011), however, who defend the one-half solution to the Judy Benjamin
problem via inverse relative entropy, do, writing of it and the classical method (Infomin; see van
Fraassen 1981): \they are not just formally but also conceptually very similar: where INFOMIN
has you select the probability function that is RE-closest to your present probability function
as seen from your current perspective, IRE minimization has you select the probability function
that is RE-closest to your present probability function as seen from the perspective you will
have after adopting the probability function to be selected." (Emphases in original.) But rst,
Douven and Romeijn have it backwards{it is Infomin that has you select the probability function
that is RE-closest to your present probability function as seen from the posterior's perspective.
And second, in the Judy Benjamin problem one constrains one's posterior to a convex set not
containing one's prior. To accept such a constraint is to already have admitted, in particular,
that one's prior isn't actual, so to accept the constraint and view things \from you current
perspective" is inconsistent. The methods aren't, then, \close cousins" at all{in fact inverse
relative entropy minimization is, in this context, an unmotivated and specious patchwork.
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Since H takes on its minimum value at 0 one must have Hx1(0) = 0. Therefore,
log( c1
cn
)2 = log anbn
a1b1
. Clearing logarithms, we obtain (1). qed
The following is a special case of the known fact that under geometric opinion
pools, \nding the consensus distribution commutes with the process of revising
distributions using a commonly agreed likelihood" (Genest and Zidek 1986).
Theorem 4. (Cf. Easwaran et. al. 2016, Theorem 9.3.) Let (A1; A2; : : : ; An)
be an ordered measurable partition. Let u be the update function having the
property that
u((a1; a2; : : : ; an); (b1; b2; : : : ; bn)) = (c1; c2; : : : ; cn);
where c2l ambm = c
2
malbl, 1  l 6= m  n: Then u commutes with conditionalization
on events in the algebra generated by A1; A2; : : : ; An.
Proof. Let E be a union of partition cells. By rearranging indices if necessary we
may assume that E = A1 [ A2 [    [ Ak for some k. Suppose we rst condition
on E, then update. After conditioning on E, we get
0i =
 a1
a1 + a2 +   + ak
;
a2
a1 + a2 +   + ak
; : : : ;
ak
a1 + a2 +   + ak
; 0; : : : ; 0

and
0j =
 b1
b1 + b2 +   + bk
;
b2
b1 + b2 +   + bk
; : : : ;
bk
b1 + b2 +   + bk
; 0; : : : ; 0

:
Now u(0i; 
0
j) = (d1; d2; : : : ; dk; 0; : : : ; 0), where
d2l
ambm
(a1 + a2 +   + ak)(b1 + b2 +   + bk)
=d2m
albl
(a1 + a2 +   + ak)(b1 + b2 +   + bk)
;
which implies that d2l ambm = d
2
malbl, 1  l 6= m  k:
Next we rst update, then condition on E. We have u(i; j) = (c1; c2; : : : ; cn),
where c2l ambm = c
2
malbl, 1  l 6= m  n: Conditioning next on E, we get to
(d1; d2; : : : ; dk; 0; : : : ; 0), where (c1 + c2 +   + ck)dm = cm, 1  m  k. Therefore
d2l (c1 + c2 +   + ck)
2ambm = d
2
m(c1 + c2 +   + ck)
2albl;
so that d2l ambm = d
2
malbl; 1  l 6= m  k: Since these equations clearly determine
d1; d2; : : : ; dk subject to the constraint d1 + d2 +   + dk = 1, we are done. qed
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Theorem 5. EGOP is the unique peer update scheme compatible with the
following set of premises.
Premise 1. Update commutes with conditionalization. In particular admissibility
is closed under conditionalization: if fA1; A2; : : : ; Ang is admissible for an agent
a, then were a to conditionalize on [
i2I=fi1;:::;itg
Ai;
(Ai1 ; : : : ; Ait) would then be admissible for a.
Premise 2. Update commutes with transparent (informationless) expansion. In
particular admissibility is closed under transparent expansion. Suppose that
if (A1; A2; : : : ; An) is admissible and fBij : 1  j  kig partitions Ai, 1 
i  n. If Prob(BijjAi) is public knowledge, 1  i  n, 1  j  ki, then
(B11; : : : ; B1k1 ; B21; : : : ; B2k2 ; : : : ; Bn1; : : : ; Bnkn) is admissible.
Premise 3. Equal weighting. If (A;B) is admissible, agent a has credence function
(t; 1 t) over (A;B) for some t 2 (0; 1) and a's peer has credence function (1 t; t)
over (A;B) then a updates to (1
2
; 1
2
) upon learning her peer's credences.
Proof. Let (A1; : : : ; An) be an admissible partition. Denote the credence func-
tions of the agent and the peer by (a1; : : : ; an) and (b1; : : : ; bn), respectively. We
must show that
u((a1; a2; : : : ; an); (b1; b2; : : : ; bn)) = (c1; c2; : : : ; cn);
where c2i ajbj = c
2
jaibi, 1  i < j  n:
Assume, without loss of generality, that aibi  ajbj. (Otherwise swap the roles of
i and j in what follows.) Consider now two hypothetical sequences of actions.
First sequence: update, then conditionalize. Here the agents rst perform a peer
update over the partition (A1; : : : ; An), getting to common posterior (c1; : : : ; cn),
then conditionalize on Ai [ Aj, getting to the credence function
 ci
ci + cj
;
cj
ci + cj

(4)
over the partition (Ai; Aj), which is admissible by Premise 1.
Second sequence: conditionalize, then update. Here the agents rst conditionalize
on Ai [ Aj, getting to the credence functions
 ai
ai + aj
;
aj
ai + aj

and
 bi
bi + bj
;
bj
bi + bj

(5)
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respectively, then perform a peer update. Since by Premise 1 their common
posterior must then agree with (4), this shows that
u
 ai
ai + aj
;
aj
ai + aj

;
 bi
bi + bj
;
bj
bi + bj

=
 ci
ci + cj
;
cj
ci + cj

: (6)
Suppose now that the agents have conditionalized on Ai [ Aj, but have not per-
formed a peer update. So their current credence functions are as in (5). Introduce
now events Bj1 and Bj2 (tossing a coin of appropriate known bias will do) that
partition Aj such that the probability of Bj1 conditional on Aj is public and equal
to
q
aibi
ajbj
 1. Consider now the following two hypothetical sequences of actions.
First sequence: update, then expand. Here the agents rst perform a peer update,
getting to

ci
ci+cj
;
cj
ci+cj

by (6), then expand to the partition (Ai; Bj1; Bj2), getting
to common posterior
 ci
ci + cj
;
cj
q
aibi
ajbj
ci + cj
; r

: (7)
Second sequence: expand, then update. Here the agents rst expand to the par-
tition (Ai; Bj1; Bj2), getting to credence functions
 ai
ai + aj
;
aj
q
aibi
ajbj
ai + aj
; ri

and
 bi
bi + bj
;
bj
q
aibi
ajbj
bi + bj
; rj

; (8)
over the partition (Ai; Bj1; Bj2), which is admissible by Premise 2. They then
perform a peer update. Since by Premise 2 their common posterior must then
agree with (7), this shows that
u
 ai
ai + aj
;
aj
q
aibi
ajbj
ai + aj
; ri

;
 bi
bi + bj
;
bj
q
aibi
ajbj
bi + bj
; rj

=
 ci
ci + cj
;
cj
q
aibi
ajbj
ci + cj
; r

: (9)
Suppose nally that the agents have expanded to (A1; Bj1; Bj2), but have not per-
formed a peer update. So their current credence functions are as in (8). Consider
now the following two hypothetical sequences of actions.
First sequence: update, then conditionalize. Here the agents rst perform a peer
update, which gets them to the credence function on the right hand side of (9).
They then conditionalize on A1 [Bj1, which gets them to common posterior
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 ci
ci + cj
q
aibi
ajbj
;
cj
q
aibi
ajbj
ci + cj
q
aibi
ajbj

: (10)
Second sequence: conditionalize, then update. Here the agents rst conditionalize
on A1 [Bj1, which gets them to the credence functions
 ai
ai + aj
q
aibi
ajbj
;
aj
q
aibi
ajbj
ai + aj
q
aibi
ajbj

and
 bi
bi + bj
q
aibi
ajbj
;
bj
q
aibi
ajbj
bi + bj
q
aibi
ajbj

over (Ai; Bj1), which is admissible by Premise 1. Letting
t =
ai
ai + aj
q
aibi
ajbj
;
the agents' credences are therefore (t; 1  t) and (1  t; t), respectively. So when
they next perform a peer update, they get to common posterior (1
2
; 1
2
) by Premise
3. On the other hand, this result must agree with that of (10) by Premise 2. So
ci = cj
q
aibi
ajbj
, from which it follows that c2i ajbj = c
2
jaibi, as desired. qed
Theorem 6. EGOP is the unique peer update scheme compatible with the
following set of premises.
Premise 1. Update commutes with conditionalization. In particular admissibility
is closed under conditionalization: if fA1; A2; : : : ; Ang is admissible for a, then
were a to condition on [
i2I=fi1;:::;itg
Ai;
(Ai1 ; : : : ; Ait) would then be admissible for them.
Premise 2. Equal weighting. If (A;B) is admissible, a has credence function
(t; 1 t) over (A;B) for some t 2 (0; 1) and a's peer has credence function (1 t; t)
over (A;B) then the agent updates to (1
2
; 1
2
).
Premise 3. Continuous update. The update function u(p; q) is continuous.
Premise 4. Update commutes with permutations of the (ordered) partition.
Premise 5. Holds fast. If the agents' priors agree, these don't change on update.
Proof. This proof is an elaboration on the third argument from Section 4. First:
Lemma A Let n and an ordered partition (A1; : : : ; An) be xed, and let 1  i 6=
j  n. If update commutes with conditionalization, then writing
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u

(a1; : : : ; an); (b1; : : : ; bn)

= (c1; : : : ; cn);
the ratio ci : cj is a function of the ratios ai : aj and bi : bj. That is to say, if
u

(d1; : : : ; dn); (e1; : : : ; en)

= (f1; : : : ; fn)
and we have di : dj  ai : aj and ei : ej  bi : bj, then also fi : fj  ci : cj.
Proof. Assume rst that (ai+aj)(bi+ bj) > 0. Imagine two sequences of actions.
First sequence. Conditionalize, then update. After conditionalizing on Ai [
Aj), the agents a; b; d and e have credence functions (
ai
ai+aj
;
aj
ai+aj
), ( bi
bi+bj
;
bj
bi+bj
),
( di
di+dj
;
dj
di+dj
) and ( ei
ei+ej
; ei
ei+ej
) respectively. By hypothesis, d's credence are equal
to a's and e's are equal to b's. Next a and b perform an update, as do d and e.
Obviously a and d wind up with the same credences.
Second sequence. Update, then conditionalize. After updating (a with b and
d with e), a and d have credence functions (c1; : : : ; cn) and (f1; : : : ; fn). After
they then conditionalize on (Ai [ Aj) they have credence functions (
ci
ci+cj
;
cj
ci+cj
)
and ( fi
fi+fj
; fi
fi+fj
). By Premise 1 these are the same credences they had at the
conclusion of the rst sequence, which recall were equal. So fi : fj  ci : cj. qed
So for x; y > 0 we can write g(x; y) = z if whenever 1  i 6= j  n, (ai + aj)(bi +
bj) > 0, ai = xaj and bi = ybj, one has ci = zcj. We claim that g(tx; sy) =
g(t; s)g(x; y). For suppose that a3 = ta2 = txa3 and b3 = sb2 = syb1. a's post-
update credence will have the form (c1; c1g(x; y); c3; : : :). On the other hand ,it
will have the form (c1; c2; c2g(t; s); : : :). Putting these together, a's post-update
credence will have the form (c1; c1g(x; y); c1g(x; y)g(t; s)). Finally, since a3 =
txa1 and b3 = syb1, posterior credence will have the form (c1; c2; c1g(tx; sy); : : :),
yielding g(tx; sy) = g(t; s)g(x; y).
This brings us to our nal lemma:
Lemma B. Let g : (0;1)(0;1) be continuous and satisfy g(tx; sy) = g(t; s)g(x; y).
Then there exist real n;m such that for all x; y > 0, one has g(x; y) = xnym.
Proof. Fix n and m so that g(2; 1) = 2n and g(1; 2) = 2m. It's clear that for
k 2 N one has g(21=k; 1)k = g(2; 1) = 2n, so that g(21=k; 1) = 2n=k, and similarly
g(1; 21=k) = 2m=k. Fixing k, it's now clear that for l 2 N one has g(2l=k; 1) =
g(21=k; 1)l = (2n=k)l = (2l=k)n, and similarly g(1; 2l=k) = (2l=k)m. Let x and y be
positive reals. Choosing a sequences of rationals ri = li=ki converging to x and
invoking continuity, one then obtains that g(x; 1) = xn. Similary g(1; y) = ym, so
that g(x; y) = g(x; 1)g(1; y) = xnym. qed
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Premise 5 implies that g(x; x) = x, so the m and n found in Lemma B must
satisfy m+n = 1. Premise 2 now tells us that g(1 t
t
; t
;
1  t) = 1 for t 2 (0; 1). So
xn m = g(x; 1
x
) = 1 for all positive x yielding n = m = 1
2
. Making a nal appeal
to continuity in the case where one has a zero ratio, EGOP follows. qed
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